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Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality
of Admitting Victim-Impact Evidence
at Capital Sentencing Hearings
JOSHUA D. GREENBERG"
INTRODUCTION
Payne v. Tennessee' held that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude a State
from introducing victim-impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.2 A flood of
critics have alleged that by allowing the admission of victim-impact evidence at
capital sentencing, Payne permits "arbitrary and capricious" sentencing in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.' Payne's opponents argue that admitting victim-impact
evidence yields arbitrarily imposed death sentences in four distinct ways: it allows the
decision whether to impose death to hinge on jurors' perceptions of victims' "worth";
gives jurors unguided discretion to determine the sorts of victim-impact evidence that
are sufficient to turn what would otherwise be a sentence of life imprisonment into
a death sentence; inflames jurors' emotions and thus produces death sentences based
on emotion rather than reason; and results in equally culpable defendants receiving
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Stanford Law School. I would like to express my gratitude to
Professor George Fisher for spending a considerable amount of his time providing
invaluable comments on previous drafts. Thanks also to Professor Miguel A. Mendez,
whose excellent instruction on the role of culpability in criminal law is (hopefully) reflected
throughout this piece, and Professor Marvin Cummins of Washington University, who first
sparked my interest in this topic and offered particularly helpful criticisms of this work in
its early stages.
1. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
2. There are three general categories of victim-impact evidence: accounts of the
emotional, psychological, and financial harm the crime caused the victim's family members
and community; descriptions of the victim's personal characteristics and attributes; and
opinions of the crime and/or the appropriate sentence for the convicted defendant Victim-
impact evidence can be presented to thejury in three ways: through live testimony, videotaped
testimony, or a written statement See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim-Impact Statements, 63 U. C-u.
L. REV. 361,390-410 (1996); Vivian Berger, Payne andSuffering-A Personal Reflection and
a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 52-55 (1992); Angela P. Harris, The
Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77; Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History oflncompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375,
382-83 (1996); Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence andArgumentAfter
Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046-47 (1993); Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou
Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim-Impact Statements in Capital
Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 93 (1997). Very few commentators have attempted to defend
Payne. Among the better efforts are Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 863 (1996), and Brian J. Johnson, Note, The Response to Payne v.
Tennessee: Giving the Victim's Family a Voice in the Capital Sentencing Process, 30 IND. L.
REV. 795 (1997). Partly because so few have tried to defend Payne, many believe that Payne
rests on political rather than legal reasoning. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Law Bows to
Politics: Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 157, 165-76 (1992).
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different sentences on the basis of unforeseen harm.4
The claims that Payne allows "arbitrary and capricious" death sentences are offthe
mark and miss the real problems both with admitting victim-impact evidence and
with the Payne Court's reasoning. Indeed, to the extent that the allegations of
arbitrariness are convincing, they apply with equal force to much of the mitigating
evidence the Court has not only permitted but required trial courts to admit during
capital sentencing hearings. Payne is constitutionally infirm not because it injected
a new element of randomness into the capital sentencing process, but rather because
it permits negligently caused harm to make the difference between life and death and
because it rests on the Justices' misplaced desire to "balance" victims' position at
sentencing with that of defendants.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of admitting victim-impact evidence
at capital sentencing hearings. I begin in Part I by discussing the three Supreme Court
rulings on the admissibility of victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings:
Parts II through V analyze the four distinct but related ways in which victim-impact
evidence allegedly results in arbitrary death sentences. Part VI explains that, while
pointing out the disjunction between harm and culpability does not mean that Payne
sanctions arbitrarily imposed death sentences, it does shed light on a deeper
constitutional flaw in Payne and the Court's death penalty jurisprudence in general:
the Court's muddled understanding of the penological theory of retribution and the
Justices' confusion regarding criminal culpability. Part VII critiques Payne's rationale
that victim-impact evidence is relevant at capital sentencing because it helps correct
an imbalance between the criminal justice system's treatment of victims relative to
defendants. I conclude by briefly examining whether Payne's constitutionality can
be successfully defended on the grounds of federalism and deference to public
opinion.
I. BOOTH, GATHERS, AND PAYNE
In 1987, the Court's five-four decision in Booth v. Maryland' held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from allowing a capital sentencing jury to consider
victim-impact evidence. The case involved the brutal murders of an elderly couple,
Irvin and Rose Bronstein.6 During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor read a victim-
impact statement that was compiled by a probation officer on the basis of her
interviews with the Bronsteins' surviving family members.7 The victim-impact
4. Many commentators have also criticized Payne for allegedly violating stare decisis by
overruling two cases decided within the four years preceding Payne: Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). This Comment does not
address, and takes no position on, whether Payne contravenes stare decisis. For a discussion
of Payne and stare decisis, see Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A "Stunning Ipse Dixit",
8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 165 (1994).
5. Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02.
6. See id. at 497.
7. See id. at 498-500. Most states do not specify who qualifies as a "victim"; the
consequence is that some courts have permitted friends of the victim, coworkers of the victim,
and even members of the community who did not know the victim to testify. See Wayne A.
Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses andAbuses of Victim Impact Evidence
1350 [Vol. 75:1349
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statement included all three forms of victim-impact evidence: accounts of the
emotional and psychological impact of the crime on the family, descriptions of the
Bronsteins' personal characteristics, and the victims' family members' opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and the defendant.'
Justice Powell's majority opinion held that all three forms of victim-impact
evidence are irrelevant to a determination of whether to impose a death sentence, and
that their admission thus risks arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty.' Justice Powell maintained that because victim-impact evidence includes
facts about which the defendant was unaware at the time of the murder, it is unrelated
to the defendant's culpability." Justice Powell said that admitting victim-impact
evidence would yield arbitrary results because victim-impact evidence would lead
juries to impermissibly base their decision on their evaluation of the "worth" of the
victim, and because the capital sentencing decision would partially depend upon the
degree to which the victim's family members-if the victim leaves any behind-are
able to articulate their loss." Moreover, Justice Powell said, victim-impact evidence
improperly shifts thejury's focus from the defendant to the victim," and hence yields
death sentences based on emotion rather than reason. 3
In separate dissents, 4 Justices White and Scalia each made the two main arguments
in Capital Trials, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 143, 154-55 (1999). However, because victim-impact
evidence is most frequently presented by the members of the victim's family, I will refer
throughout this Comment to victim-impact witnesses as "the victim's family members."
Definitions of "victim" that extend beyond the victim's immediate family can be very
cumbersome for courts. If numerous people desired to testify regarding a particular murder,
the trial could be slowed and the judge's time diverted to considering the admissibility of
reams of proffered victim-impact testimony. Indeed, this is precisely what happened during the
recent trials of Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, during which
a combined 93 victim-impact witnesses testified. See id. at 156-57. Moreover, although a
murder affects an entire community, the victim's family members are--other than the victim
herself-the persons most directly and severely harmed by a murder. Therefore, if victim-
impact evidence is to be admitted, only the victim's family members, or psychologists who
have interviewed the family members, should be allowed to offer victim-impact testimony.
8. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 499-500.
9. See id- at 502-03 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., joining).
10. See id. at 505.
II. See id. at 505-06. Thus, Justice Powell argued, admitting victim-impact evidence would
fail to provide "'a principled way to distinguish [cases] in which the death penalty was
imposed, from the many cases in which it was not."' Id. at 506 (Stewart, J.) (alteration in
original) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
12. The Court has held that the focus during a capital sentencing hearing must be on the
defendant. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
13. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507-09. The Court has held that the capital sentencing decision
must not be based on emotion. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality
opinion) ("It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."), quotedwith approvalin Becky. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,637-38 (1980). However,
excluding emotion from the capital sentencing decision is easier said than done. See infra Part
IV.
14. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 515, 519 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia, JJ.,
2000]
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for including victim-impact evidence.' 5 First, they argued that not only the
defendant's mental state, but also the harm suffered by the victim's family and
community is relevant to the defendant's criminal responsibility, as illustrated by our
criminal law's enhancement of punishments on the basis of the harm caused
irrespective of the defendant's intentions. 6 Second, they argued that victim-impact
evidence balances the effect of the defendant's mitigating evidence and reminds the
jury that the victim as well as the defendant is an individual human being whose life
deserves respect.' 7 It is important to understand the distinction between these two
arguments. The second argument, which I shall refer to as the "balancing
justification," holds that victim-impact evidence should be admitted to counter
mitigating evidence and improve the surviving victims' position at sentencing relative
to the allegedly improper "privileged" position held by the defendant. In contrast,
Justices White and Scalia's first argument, which I shall refer to as the "harm-based
justification," does not view the issue in terms of balancing victims' rights against
defendants', but rather focuses on the relevance of harm to criminal liability.
dissenting; Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
15. Victims' rights advocates often make a third argument: that including victim-impact
evidence, particularly in the form of oral testimony, assists victims' efforts to cope with the
psychological impact of the crime by helping victims regain a sense of control and allowing
them to "vent" their anger at the defendant. None of the Justices offered this argument for
including victim-impact evidence at sentencing. I shall address this argument along with the
"balancing" justification in Part VII. See infra text accompanying notes 152-59.
16. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Both noted that the difference between reckless driving and manslaughter depends
not on intent, but rather on the harm caused (the fortuity of whether a pedestrian happened to
be crossing the street when the driver passed by). See id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting); id. at
519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent took the harm-based irgument particularly
far, arguing that the state may, "if it chooses, include as a sentencing consideration the
particularized harm that an individual's murder causes to the rest of society." IM at 517.
Apparently Justice White would allow a State to make the severity of a murderer's sentence
depend in part on the perceived social utility of his victim. See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 874-
75 n.32.
However, in practice distinguishing between evidence of the victim's personal
characteristics and the harm inflicted upon the victim's survivors will often be very difficult:
evidence of the latter will often include some evidence of the former. As Justice Scalia asked,
"Would the fact that the victim was a dutiful husband and father be [an admirable] personal
characteristic or an indication of injury to others?" South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,
823 (1989). If the victim was an alcoholic who abused his children, however, presumably the
victim's family would not suffer the same amount of harm as would the survivors in Justice
Scalia's example. Butsee Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (arguing that ajury's
consideration of the harm visited upon society by the victim's loss need not and should not
include ajudgment of the victim's personal characteristics-and thus implicitly ajudgment of
the victim's "worth"-but rather should entail only that the jury consider the victim's
"'uniqueness as an individual human being'). In contrast to Justices White, Scalia, and
O'Connor (in their respective Booth and Gathers opinions), Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for the Court in Payne presupposes that a distinction can be made between a victim's
admirable personal characteristics and the harm visited upon society by the loss of these
personal characteristics.
17. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1352 [Vol. 75:1349
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In 1989, Gathers-another five-four decision-extended Booth to cover
prosecutors' comments on murder victims' personal characteristics. 8 Gathers
involved the brutal murder of and sexual assault on Richard Haynes, a mentally
unstable homeless man. 9 In an attempt to enable the jury to more fully comprehend
the human loss involved, the prosecutor made various references in his closing
argument at the sentencing phase about Haynes's personality and character, including
inferring from Haynes's possession of religious articles and voter registration card
that Haynes was a man of faith who cared about his community, reading a prayer
written by Haynes that was found at the murder scene, and noting that Haynes had
mental problems.20 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan found the prosecutor's
statement "indistinguishable in any relevant respect from that in Booth,"'" and thus
likewise violative of the Eighth Amendment. While victim-impact evidence relevant
to the circumstances of the crime is admissible, the prosecutor's statements went far
beyond those facts.'
Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, argued that Booth should not be interpreted as
"'foreclosing the introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder
victim."'" Such a "rigid Eighth Amendment rule," she maintained, "is not supported
by history or societal consensus," and would exclude evidence which would help the
jury understand "the vulnerability and simple humanity of the victim," and thus
would help the jury assess the harm caused to society by the loss of this particular
victim.24 Therefore, although not explicitly as in White's Booth dissent, Justice
O'Connor's dissent implicitly approves of having the capital sentencing decision
depend in part on jurors' evaluations of victims' worth; if the harm caused to the
victims' community by the loss of the victims' attributes is relevant to sentencing,
then calculations of-and sentences based on-victims' worth are unavoidable.2"
Dissenting alone, Justice Scalia argued that Booth was wrongly decided and should
be overruled.26 However, Justice Scalia went further than merely arguing, as he did
in his Booth dissent, that the specific harm inflicted by the defendant may be
18. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805.
19. Id. at 806-07.
20. See id. at 808-10.
21. Id. at 811. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's
opinion. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion maintaining that the Court could not
approve of the Gathers prosecutor's comments without overruling Booth. Id. at 812.
22. See id. at 811-12.
23. Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 398
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
24. Id. at 820-21.
25. See id. at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
That the victim in this case was a deeply religious and harmless individual who
exhibited his care for his community by religious proselytization and political
participation in its affairs was relevant to the community's loss at his demise, just
as society would view with grief and anger the killing of the mother or father of
small children.
Id.
26. See id. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2000] 1353
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considered. Like Justice White's Booth dissent, Justice Scalia's dissent explicitly
endorses the consideration of "admirable" personal characteristics of murder
victims. 2 7 Justice Scalia said that there is "no basis for drawing a distinction for
Eighth Amendment purposes between the admirable personal characteristics of the
particular victim and the particular injury caused to the victim's family and fellow
citizens. Indeed, I would often find it impossible to tell which was which."2 For
Justice Scalia, the victim's personal characteristics are inextricably intertwined with
the extent of the harm visited upon society by her loss.
Five years later, the Court dramatically changed course, overruling Booth and
Gathers in its six-three decision in Payne.29 Payne involved a particularly brutal
attack on Charisse Christopher and her two small children, two-year-old Lacie and
three-year-old Nicholas, that left Charisse and Lacie dead, and Nicholas with stab
wounds that went through his body from front to back." At the sentencing phase, the
State presented the testimony of the children's grandmother, who testified about the
effect of the crimes on the now-orphaned young boy.3' Additionally, the prosecutor
commented extensively on the impact of the murders on Nicholas, and said that
Nicholas will "want to know what type ofjustice was done" when he is older.32
Writing for the Court,33 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited both the "harm-based" and
"balancing" justifications for including victim-impact evidence at capital
sentencing.34 "[A] State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess
meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have
before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the
defendant."3 Furthermore, the Chief Justice argued, Booth "unfairly weighted the
scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating
evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances, the
State is barred from ... offering 'a glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to
extinguish."'36 Therefore, "if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim-
27. Id. at 823.
28. Id.
29. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The arguments about admitting victim-
impact evidence at capital sentencing remained largely the same. The main differences in
Payne from the Court's rulings in Booth and Gathers were personnel changes (Justices Powell
and Brennan retired in 1988 and 1990, respectively, and were replaced by Justices Kennedy
and Souter) and that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy believed that
the question addressed in Booth was squarely presented in Payne (they had refrained from
voting to overrule Booth in Gathers because they believed the latter presented a distinct case).
Additionally, Justice White overcame his reluctance in Gathers to overrule Booth even though
he continued to believe it wrongly decided.
30. Id. at 812-13.
31. See id. at 814-15.
32. Id. at 815.
33. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion of the Court. See id. at 810.
34. See id. at 825-27.
35. Id. at 825.
36. Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)); see also id. at 825.
"The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the
1354 [Vol. 75:1349
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impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar."37 Importantly, however, Payne allows only evidence of the
victim's personal characteristics and the harm inflicted upon the victim's family and
community. Payne did not alter Booth's holding that admitting evidence of the
victims' opinions of the crime and of the appropriate sentence for the defendant
violates the Eighth Amendment. 8
Not content with merely allowing victim-impact evidence, Chief Justice Rehnquist
announced that courts should handle it just like any other relevant evidence.39 Thus
Payne allows a wide variety of victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing, for trial
courts need not exercise more caution when dealing with proposed victim-impact
evidence than they do with other relevant evidence. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it
defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer
should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family."
Id (citation omitted in original) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting)).
37. Id. at 827 (emphasis omitted).
38. Because Payne does not permit evidence of victims' views on whether a capital
defendant deserves the death penalty, this Comment focuses on the two other types of victim-
impact evidence: evidence of the harm caused by the murder, and evidence of the victims'
personal characteristics. Booth was correct, however, to preclude the introduction of evidence
of victims' views on the appropriate sentence. The adversaries in the criminal process are the
people (the State) and the defendant, not the victim and the defendant; ours is not a system of
private prosecution. Victims' views are therefore irrelevant to whether the defendant deserves
the death penalty. See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 870 n.17 (noting that evidence of the victim's
"survivors' personal opinions about the defendant and the appropriate sentence.., is the sort
of witness 'opinion evidence' that is typically inadmissible"); Dugger, supra note 3, at 382
(pointing out that when victims state their opinions on the appropriate sentence they are
testifying about things other than their personal experience, and their testimony is thus "not
only emotional and biased.., but also uninformed"). Moreover, while jurors are impartial,
victims are obviously biased against the defendant. Therefore, "the victim's opinion as to the
sentence the defendant deserves tends to inflame the jury and renders it potentially more
prejudicial than any other type of victim information." Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The
Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLAL. REV.
199, 211 (1988). Furthermore, if the victim's family members are allowed to determine, or
help determine, whether a defendant lives or dies, this would make the imposition of capital
punishment depend on the irrelevant factor of whether the victim's family opposes capital
punishment. See Catherine Bendor, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims' Rights: Payne v.
Tennessee, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219, 242 n.l 19 (1992). Finally, victim opinion
evidence "might impermissibly encourage the jury to shirk its ultimate responsibility for the
death decision and simply act as the agent of the grieving family." Harris, supra note 3, at 93.
Admitting victim opinion evidence therefore might contravene the principle of Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), which held that becausejurors must not be tempted to dodge
the weighty task of deciding whether to impose death, prosecutors cannot suggest to the jury
that ultimate responsibility for a death sentence rests with the appellate court rather than with
the jury. See Harris, supra note 3, at 93.
39. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 ("There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than
other relevant evidence is treated.").
2000] 1355
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renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.
40
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the strong public support for
admitting victim-impact evidence at sentencing, and expanded upon Rehnquist's due
process analysis. 41 Justice O'Connor pointed out that the possibility that victim-
impact evidence could be "unduly inflammatory" does not justify excluding all such
evidence; "[t]rial courts routinely exclude evidence that is unduly inflammatory," and
can handle victim-impact evidence just like any other form of potentially disruptive
evidence.42
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, also concurred, noting that "criminal
conduct has traditionally been categorized and penalized differently according to
consequences not specifically intended, but determined in part by conditions
unknown to a defendant when he acted. '43 But in contrast to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court and the dissenting Justices in Booth and Gathers,
Justice Souter maintained that victim-impact evidence helps the jury assess the
defendant's blameworthiness. "Murder has foreseeable consequences .... Every
defendant knows ... that the person to be killed probably has close associates,
,survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death....
[H]arm to some group of survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so
foreseeable as to be virtually inevitable. 44
40. Id. at 825 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)).
41. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 151, 158.
42. Id. Justice O'Connor also made the dubious argument that in the instant case, the "brief
[victim impact] statement did not inflame [the jury's] passions more than did the facts of the
crime." Id. at 831-32. But as Jonathan Levy notes, this
implies that unconstitutionally inflammatory evidence only warrants reversal
when it is the most inflammatory evidence put before the jury. The underlying
assumption here is that less inflammatory remarks have no effect on jurors when
overshadowed by more inflammatory remarks. In other words, either
inflammatory comments have no cumulative effect, or jurors reach some
saturation point beyond which additional inflammatory comments have no effect.
Levy, supra note 3, at 1057 (footnote omitted). Because the facts of the crime tend to be
particularly inflammatory in capital cases, Justice O'Connor's argument would permit the most
inflammatory victim-impact evidence in capital cases-"the very cases that the Eighth
Amendment requires have the most protection." Id.
43. Payne, 501 U.S. at 835-36. Justice Scalia concurred as well, but did not discuss the
relevance of victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing. Instead, Justice Scalia stated that he
would vote to allow victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing even if the Court reversed its
rulings in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982), "requiring the admission of all relevant mitigating evidence," and
responded to Justice Marshall's allegation that Payne violates stare decisis. Payne, 501 U.S.
at 833-35. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the portion of Justice Scalia's opinion in
which he addressed Justice Marshall's stare decisis argument. See id. at 833.
44. Payne, 501 U.S. at 838. Justice Souter also briefly stated the balancing justification:
"Indeed, given a defendant's option to introduce relevant evidence in mitigation, sentencing
without such evidence of victim impact may be seen as a significantly imbalanced process."
Id at 839 (citations omitted).
1356 [Vol. 75:1349
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In addition, Justice Souter said that Booth "sets an unworkable standard of
constitutional relevance."4 Because Booth precludes the sentencing jury from
considering victim-impact evidence of which the defendant was unaware when he
committed the crime, trial courts will either have to exclude evidence of the victim's
personal characteristics and family situation during the guilt phase-even if such
evidence is relevant as contextual information-or empanel a separate jury for the
sentencing phase.46 Furthermore, Justice Souter stated, under Booth, whether victim-
impact evidence is admissible at sentencing depends on the arbitrary fortuity of
whether a murder victim's personal characteristics or family members happened to
be directly involved in the circumstances of the crime.
47
Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented; Justice Blackmun joined each dissent.48
Justice Marshall argued that the principles enunciated in Booth remain valid, and
responded to the majority's arguments by citing Justice Powell's and Justice
Brennan's respective opinions in Booth and Gathers.49 Justice Marshall charged that
because the majority's arguments were the same as those offered by the dissenting
Justices in Booth and Gathers, the Court's ruling was due solely to a change in
personnel." Thus, Justice Marshall said, the Court's decision was based on "[p]ower,
not reason"5 and blatantly violated stare decisis 2 In response to Justice Souter's
foreseeability argument, Justice Marshall said that "even where the defendant was in
a position to foresee the likely impact of his conduct, admission of victim-impact
evidence creates an unacceptable risk of sentencing arbitrariness" by shifting the
jury's focus from the defendant to the victim's status in the community and allowing
punishment to depend in part upon the extent to which the victim's family can
articulately express their grief.53
Justice Stevens's dissent argued thatvictim-impact evidence contravenes the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty
in three ways. First, Justice Stevens rejected the harm-basedjustification, contending
that unforeseeable victim characteristics are irrelevant to the defendant's "'personal
responsibility and moral guilt' and thus when considered as a factor at sentencing
will lead to sentences out ofproportion to the defendant's blameworthiness.54 Second,
Justice Stevens pointed out that "the quantity and quality of victim impact evidence
sufficient to turn a verdict of life in prison into a verdict of death is not defined until
after the crime has been committed and therefore cannot possibly be applied
consistently in different cases" since jurors' discretion is not "'suitably directed and
limited."' 55 Third, Justice Stevens said that victim-impact evidence "serves no
45. Id.
46. See id. at 841.
47. See id. at 839-42.
48. See id. at 844, 856.
49. See id. at 845-46.
50. See id. at 844.
51. Id
52. See id. at 844-45, 849-56.
53. Id. at 846 (emphasis in original).
54. See id. at 860-61 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
55. Id. at 861 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
Justice Stevens' point also raises due process concerns: the specific forms of harm inflicted
2000] 1357
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purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life on
the basis of their emotions rather than their reason."5 6
Commentators on Payne have largelyjustparroted the preceding arguments offered
by the Justices in Booth, Gathers, and Payne. None has satisfactorily clarified
Payne's flaws. Instead, Payne's critics have made four distinct but similarly
problematic arguments that Payne permits arbitrary death sentences. Before
explaining the real reasons why Payne is such a deeply troubling decision, I now
proceed to consider the four allegations of arbitrariness in tum.
II. VICTIMS' "WORTH" AND THE
CAPITAL SENTENCING DECISION
Opponents of admitting victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing assert that it
results in the imposition of capital punishment on the basis of victims' personal
characteristics and jurors' perceptions of victims' worth. 7 This argument can be
based on either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment claim
is that sentencing murderers in part on the basis of their victims' personal
characteristics is arbitrary. The Fourteenth Amendment claim is that victim-impact
evidence leads juries to discriminate against victims who are members of unpopular
groups, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that the law protect
all persons equally. 8
A. The Eighth Amendment Claim
Victim-impact evidence may encourage jurors to engage in "selective
sympathy" 9 and to be improperly influenced by factors such as the victim's race,
upon a murder victim's survivors are not statutorily proscribed; thus the defendant has no
advance notice that he will be held responsible for this harm. I will return to this point in Part
III.
56. Id. at 856.
57. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 406; Beth E. Sullivan, Harnessing Payne:
Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact Statements To Safeguard Capital Sentencing
Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601,628 (1998); Talbert, supra
note 38, at 209-11; Levy, supra note 3, at 1044-48, 1060; Phillips, supra note 3, at 105-12.
Even proponents of victim-impact evidence recognize the potential problem here. See Gewirtz,
supra note 3, at 874.
58. At first it may appear that a defendant would lack standing to bring this claim, since
a jury which devalued the life of the defendant's victim would thereby help, not harm, the
defendant. However, the Court held in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991), that a
white defendant has standing to object to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike
African-American venirepersons. In addition, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), said
that a defendant has standing to bring an equal protection challenge if he alleges that the State
is "bas[ing] enforcement of its criminal laws on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification."' Id. at 291-92 n.8 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)).
59. Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 879 n.50. However, selective sympathy is as much a problem
with mitigating evidence-and all other forms of evidence-as it is with victim-impact
evidence. See id. For a general discussion of selective sympathy, see Paul Brest, The Supreme
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ethnicity, social class, occupation, level of education, and perceived "goodness" or
"morality."' Jurors could also base their decision in part on the victim's family
members' articulateness, familiarity with the English language, and ability and
willingness to convey their grief and emotional loss.6 Because testimony regarding
the victim's personal characteristics directs jurors' attention to the victim's
individuality, jurors are more likely to consider impermissible victim characteristics
in their sentencing decision notwithstanding any knowledge of these characteristics
that they may have gained from the guilt phase. Even if jurors do not consciously
base their sentencing decision on their perceptions of the victim and her family
members' "value," victim-impact evidence could increase the extent to whichjurors'
unconscious biases influence their deliberations.
6 2
However, many forms of mitigating evidence are as likely as victim-impact
evidence to influence a defendant's sentence on the basis of improper factors. Pleas
for mercy from the defendant's relatives are perhaps more likely to succeed when
these relatives articulately appeal to jurors' selective sympathies than when jurors
view them as poorly spoken members of unpopular groups. Yet opponents of victim-
impact evidence almost invariably accept the relevance and value of mitigating
evidence offered by the defendant's family members and close friends, and the Court
has requiredthat rial courts permit such mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase
of a capital trial.63 Because the Court has implicitly (by requiring its admission) held
that mitigating evidence cannot yield arbitrary death sentences, it would be logically
inconsistent for the Court to consider victim-impact evidence arbitrary in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.' The two types of evidence result in sentences based on
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1976).
60. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 365,398,408; Berger, supra note 3, at 52-55; Harris,
supra note 3, at 96-98.
61. See, e.g., Talbert, supra note 38, at 209-10 (noting that different victims' family
members have varying degrees of communication skills and willingness to testify); Phillips,
supra note 3, at 109 (noting the possibility that jurors will place lower values on the lives of
recent immigrants whose family members have not yet mastered English because the family
members will be unable to effectively convey their loss).
62. Cf Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing the phenomenon of
unconscious racism and arguing that equal protection analysis must take it into account).
63. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (holding that the capital
sentencing authority may not refuse to consider, as a matter of law, relevant mitigating
evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that a state
may not preclude the capital sentencing authority from taking relevant mitigating evidence into
account). Both Eddings and Lockett defined "relevant mitigating evidence" as "'any aspect of
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."' Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett,
438 U.S. at 604). By broadly defining mitigating evidence and failing to limit who may offer
mitigating testimony, Eddings and Lockett compel trial judges to admit emotional pleas for the
defendant's life by third parties such as the defendant's relatives, friends, and coworkers.
64. In their respective dissents in Lockett, however, Justices White and Rehnquist
expressed concern that the Court's decision that capital defendants must be permitted to
introduce all relevant mitigating evidence at sentencing would result in a return to the situation
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analogous fortuities; if one does not inject an "arbitrary and capricious" component
into sentencing, then neither does the other.
Defendants, like victims, may be unemployed drifters with no family members or
friends able and willing to testify at a capital sentencing hearing. These defendants
will be unable to proffer any mitigating evidence, which will likely increase their
chance of receiving the death penalty. Other capital defendants, however, may be
prominent pediatricians with loving wives, children, fellow doctors, and patients who
will plead for the jury to spare these convicted murderers but nonetheless
"wonderful" people the death penalty.6" Similarly, some defendants will have highly
educated, physically attractive relatives who can emotionally but articulately plead
for the defendant's life, while other defendants will have ugly relatives incapable of
which Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), attempted to remedy. See Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 623 (White, J., dissenting) ("I greatly fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will
be to compel constitutionally a restoration of the state of affairs at the time Furman was
decided .. "); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lockett "will not eliminate
arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize
it. By encouraging [the] consideration [of] anything under the sun as a 'mitigating
circumstance,' it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it."); see also
Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 54 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In my view this Court has no colorable basis, either in constitutional text or in
national tradition, for imposing upon the States a further constitutional
requirement that the sentencer consider mitigating evidence, see Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 671-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). As this and other cases upon our docket amply show,
that recently invented requirement has introduced not only a mandated
arbitrariness quite inconsistent with Furman, but also an impenetrable complexity
and hence a propensity to error that make a scandal and a mockery of the capital
sentencing process.
Id.
65. One might raise two objections at this point. First, one might argue that it ignores
reality to consider the mitigating testimony that wealthy capital defendants could offer: capital
murder defendants are overwhelmingly poor and uneducated, and any wealthy person charged
with murder will have paid counsel of sufficient competence to make a death sentence
inconceivable. But the examples involving wealthy defendants are intended not to reflect
reality, but only to sharpen the main point here, which is that there are significant parallels
between how victim-impact evidence and mitigating evidence presented by a defendant's
family members or friends can influence a capital sentencing decision, and that these parallels
logically preclude considering one but not the other "arbitrary."
Second, and building on the first objection, since capital defendants are more
demographically homogeneous than are murder victims, the disparities in capital defendants'
abilities to put on convincing mitigating evidence are less significant than are the
corresponding disparities for victims' relatives' presentations. Therefore, the objection would
continue, victim-impact evidence may arbitrarily influence capital sentencing even if
mitigating evidence in the form of third parties' testimonials does not, since victim-impact
evidence's influence would vary more from case to case than would the influence of third-party
mitigating evidence. But this objection attempts to transform a difference in degree into a
difference in kind: the salient factor here is not the extent to which a third party's testimony
influences capital sentencing hearings or to which its influence varies from case to case, but
rather the manner in which it influences capital sentencing hearings.
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enunciating a single grammatically correct and cogent sentence or publicly displaying
grief; the former category of defendants will, other things being equal, evade the
death penalty more often than the latter." If it is not arbitrary to allow jurors to refuse
to impose a death sentence on the basis of their perceptions of the defendant's and his
family members' personal characteristics, then it cannot be arbitrary to allow jurors
to impose a death sentence on the basis of their perceptions of the victim's and her
family members' personal characteristics.67
But perhaps what constitutes constitutionally unacceptable "arbitrariness"-depends
on whether the capital sentencing decision is tilted towards death or errs in favor of
life. Indeed, by requiring trial courts to admit mitigating evidence at capital
sentencing, the Court may have recognized-but left unstated-the risk that some
defendants would escape death for purely fortuitous reasons, yet nonetheless decided
that arbitrariness favoring life raises no constitutional difficulties. However, if by
mandating the admission of mitigating evidence the Court was tacitly conceding that
mitigating evidence injects an element of randomness into the capital sentencing
process, then Lockett and Eddings seem inconsistent with Furman's holding that
death sentences cannot be meted out arbitrarily." Furman never said that arbitrariness
that favors defendants raises no constitutional concerns; to the contrary, Furman
condemned all arbitrariness in capital sentencing.69 Under Furman, therefore, Lockett
and Eddings must be viewed as rejecting the contention that mitigating evidence
yields arbitrary results. At least for the purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis,
mitigating evidence cannot be considered arbitrary, and thus neither can its analog,
victim-impact evidence.
Once stripped of its presupposition that evidence of personal and family
characteristics yields arbitrary results when presented as victim-impact evidence but
not when presented as mitigating evidence, this argument is revealed for what itreally
is: a veiled equal protection claim. Those who make the first arbitrariness argument
do so more out of a (reasonable) concern that it is immoral to place differing values
66. While some complain that victim-impact statements "reward" with the death penalty
emotional displays by a victim's family members, see Phillips, supra note 3, at 112, they are
silent with regard to the fact that defendants' family members are similarly rewarded with a
life sentence for their tearful pleas for mercy. Cf Maria Imperial, A Contrasting View of
Victims'Rights,N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1992, at2 ("Should defendants be denied their rights based
on the fear that some defendants are more eloquent than others or could afford higher priced
defense attorneys?"); Christine D. Marton, Comment, The Admissibility of Victim-Impact
Evidence at the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 801, 806 n.41 (1993)
("The argument concerning the possibility that a victim's articulateness as well as a victim's
financial position might result in unequal justice can be likewise applied to defendants.").
67. Importantly, the point is not that defendants' rights must be balanced with victims'
rights, but rather that the Court cannot consider victim-impact evidence arbitrary if it does not
consider mitigating evidence arbitrary. Either both mitigating and victim-impact evidence yield
arbitrary results or neither does.
68. Cf Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.").
69. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("Furman held that [capital
punishment] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk
that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.").
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on different human lives than out of their concern thatjuries' evaluations of different
humans' worth will result in "arbitrary and capricious" imposition of capital
punishment (for if this were their true concern, then they would also oppose allowing
analogous forms of mitigating evidence). Thus the first arbitrariness argument should
be evaluated under Equal Protection Clause rather than Eighth Amendment
principles.
B. The Equal Protection Claim
The controlling precedent regarding jurors' discrimination on the basis of a murder
victim's personal characteristics is McCleskey v. Kemp.7" In McCleskey, the Court
held that a complex statistical analysis, the Baldus Study, which concluded that, in
Georgia, capital defendants charged with murdering white victims were 4.3 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with murdering blacks, did
not demonstrate that Georgia's capital sentencing process violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.7 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, noted
that "a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving
'the existence of purposeful discrimination,""'72 and that "the purposeful
discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him."'73 Hence to show an Equal
Protection Clause violation, McCleskey had to "prove that the decisionmakers in his
case acted with discriminatory purpose."'74 Because each jury "is unique in its
composition" and considers "innumerable factors that vary according to the
characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular capital
offense," one cannot infer from a statistical analysis that aparticular jury considered
the victim's race as a factor in determining whether the defendant deserves the death
penalty.75
Moreover, Justice Powell argued, "[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal
justice process," the Court requires "exceptionally clear proof before we would infer
that the discretion has been abused."76 Justice Powell maintained that a statistical
analysis which took into account 230 nonracial factors that might influence a capital
70. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
71. Id. at 291-99. McCleskey also said that the Baldus study did not prove that Georgia's
capital punishment system violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 299-319.
72. Id. at 292 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
73. Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 294. Justice Powell said that while the Court had held that statistics could prove
discrimination in the context of selection of jury venires and employment decisions, the
situation is different for juries' sentencing decisions. See id. at 294-95.
The decisions of a jury commission or of an employer over time are fairly
attributable to the commission or the employer. Therefore, an unexplained
statistical discrepancy can be said to indicate a consistent policy of the
decisionmaker. The Baldus study seeks to deduce a state 'policy' by studying the
combined effects of the decisions of hundreds of juries that are unique in their
composition.
Id. at 295 n.15; see also id. at 293-96.
76. Id. at 297.
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sentencing juror did not constitute "exceptionally clear proof."" Thus McCleskey
made it virtually impossible for a capital defendant to demonstrate that his victim's
race was a factor in his death sentence: to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation,
a capital defendant must demonstrate that the jury that sentenced him to death
considered the defendant's race as a factor in its sentencing determination, and that
racial bias was the "but-for" cause of the death sentence.7" Under this standard, the
only realistic way a defendant can prove his jury's decision was motivated by racial
bias is ifthe jurors say so. Only in extremely rare cases will ajuror come forward and
admit that he or his fellow jurors sentenced a defendant to death because they dislike
persons ofhis race. Therefore, McCleskey's effect is to allow capital sentencingjurors
to consider the victim's race in its sentencing determination so long as they do not
talk about the discriminatory basis for their decision outside of the jury room.79
The dicta in McCleskey similarly dismissed the possibility of allowing defendants
to demonstrate via statistical analyses the influence on sentencing of victims'
characteristics other than race. 0 One can assume that the Court would not impose a
more exacting standard on attempts to prove bias on characteristics other than race
than the standard McCleskey imposed on attempts to prove racial bias. Moreover,
while racial, religious, and ethnic distinctions are subject to "strict scrutiny," the
ability to articulately and emotionally convey grief, level of education, and class are
not "suspect" categories and thus are subject only to "rationality" review.8 Although
77. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 337 (1997) (noting that "Powell
and the Court majority resolutely shut the door to any statistics-driven, class-based challenge
to the administration of punishment"); David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the
"Inevitability" ofRacial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" oflts
Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 370 (1994) ("The
standard set by McCleskey for proving constitutional violations means that proof of racial
discrimination in capital punishment cases is beyond the capacity of virtually all capital
defendants.").
79. Though the Supreme Court prefers to ignore the problem by setting an impossibly high
standard of proof, overwhelming evidence suggests that whether a capital defendant gets the
death penalty depends largely on the race of his victim. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL
DISPARrrIES 5-6 (1990) (analyzing the results of 28 studies from various jurisdictions, all of
which found that the victim's race was a significant factor in the imposition of capital
punishment); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 708-10 (1983)
(providing extensive supporting data for, and statistical analysis of, the Baldus study's race-of-
victim findings). For a list of additional studies finding a correlation between a murderer's
likelihood of receiving a death sentence and his victim's race, see KENNEDY, supra note 78,
at 450 n.51.
80. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297, 315-19.
81. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Levy argues
that "whether a victim has an articulate and caring family is just as arbitrary a characteristic as
the color of the victim's skin." Levy, supra note 3, at 1044-45 n.137. That may be true, but
whether a victim has an articulate and caring family is not constitutionally arbitrary. While the
Constitution bars distinctions along racial lines, it says nothing about distinctions on the basis
of a person's family members' articulateness or capacity for empathy. These characteristics
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considering these victim characteristics when imposing the death penalty is very
controversial and probably bad policy, the Court would almost certainly refuse to find
it unconstitutional because it is not irrational. Therefore, when victim-impact
evidence is presented to a capital sentencingjury, a defendant given the death penalty
can challenge his sentence on equal protection grounds only if he can demonstrate
that the jurors in his case considered the victim's race, religion, or ethnicity in
reaching their decision or if the statute authorizing the introduction of victim-impact
evidence lists these constitutionally suspect classifications as relevant to the capital
sentencing decision.
Additionally, it should be noted that "in other legal contexts, such as civil wrongful
death actions, juries are invited to make different-sized damage awards based on the
relative harm caused by the loss of the life in question or some similar valuation."82
While measuring the value of different human lives seems morally repugnant to
many, our law already permits such measurements in the civil context, and, under
McCleskey, effectively in the criminal context as well,83 so it is difficult to see how
evidence that allows or even encourages these judgments violates the Constitution.
For that matter, it appears that no constitutional impediment prevents a legislature
from explicitly including a threshold valuation of the murder victim's worth to
society as an aggravating factor in capital sentencing, unless the legislature includes
a constitutionally suspect characteristic as a factor relevant to the jury's calculation
of the victim's social value.
III. GUIDELINES, DISCRETION, AND THE
ELIGIBILITY-SELECTION DICHOTOMY
In his Payne dissent, Justice Stevens alleged that admitting victim-impact evidence
at capital sentencing is arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment because "the
quantity and quality of victim-impact evidence sufficient to turn a verdict of life in
appear to lie outside the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). Thus rationality review applies to
allegations of discrimination on the basis of a nonsuspect characteristic of a victim. Even if a
defendant satisfied McCleskey's standard of proof, such discrimination is not clearly irrational
Indeed, some devotees of "law and economics" argue that considering victims' "value" in
assessing punishments would more efficiently deter crime. See David D. Friedman, Should the
Characteristics of Victims and Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of
Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 731,747-56 (1993) (arguing that considering a murder
victim's characteristics in the capital sentencing decision is efficient, at least in cases where the
murderer knew the victim's characteristics ex ante).
82. Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 875-76 n.32.
83. While McCleskey did not technically "permit" assigning values to victims' lives, its
standard of proof is virtually impossible to meet and apparently applies to claims of
discrimination on the basis of nonsuspect victim characteristics. See supra text accompanying
notes 76-79. Thus McCleskey in practice-although admittedly not in theory--allows
prosecutors and jurors to discriminate on the basis of victims' characteristics.
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prison into a verdict of death is not defined until after the crime has been committed
and therefore cannot possibly be applied consistently in different cases."" But the
same is true of mitigating evidence: jurors' discretion to consider and weigh
mitigating factors is totally unconstrained." Since the Court requires that capital
sentencing jurors be permitted to decrease a death sentence to life imprisonment on
the basis of undefined mitigating evidence and in the absence of any statutory
guidelines for considering that evidence, logic dictates that it cannot be arbitrary to
allow jurors to increase a life sentence to a death sentence on the basis of victim-
impact evidence when the statute authorizing that evidence directs the jurors to
consider certain broadly defined but limited categories of victim-impact evidence.
Furthermore, the Court has "distinguished between two different aspects of the
capital sentencing process, the eligibility phase and the selection phase."86 Because
victim-impact evidence is not introduced to prove the existence of an aggravating
factor, it, like mitigating evidence, is relevant only to the selection phase. 7 While the
Court has underscored the need to channel and limit the jury's discretion during the
eligibility phase in order to avoid the arbitrary or capricious imposition of death,88 it
has taken a quite different approach toward the selection phase. "Once the jury finds
that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible
for the death penalty ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to
determine whether death is the appropriate punishment."8 9 As the Court said in
Buchanan v. Angelone, "[I]n the selection phase, we have emphasized the need for
84. Payne, 501 U.S. at 861.
85. Moreover, current capital sentencing statutes' guidelines (or lack thereof) for jurors'
consideration of mitigating evidence are a direct result of the Court's rulings preventing
legislators from attempting to guide capital sentencing jurors' consideration of mitigating
factors. See supra text accompanying note 63.
86. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269,273 (1998); see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512
U.S. 967,971 (1994). In the eligibility phase, the jury decides whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty, usually by determining whether the murder involved aggravating
circumstances. In the selection phase, the jury decides whether a death-eligible defendant
should be executed. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 273; Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73.
87. See Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1995) (Under Florida's capital
sentencing system, "victim impact evidence is admitted only after there is present in the record
evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The evidence is not admitted as an
aggravator.... ."); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 n.15 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (noting
that victim-impact evidence does not help thejury determine whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty because it cannot help prove the existence of an aggravating factor, and
thus cannot support the imposition of a death sentence in the absence of an aggravating factor);
Johnson, supra note 3, at 805-06 ("Aggravating circumstances are facts sufficient to elevate
a crime to a death-eligible category, while victim impact evidence are [sic] facts relevant to a
determination as to whether a death sentence should be imposed on a death-eligible
defendant.").
88. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275; cf Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64
(1988) (striking down instruction allowing the jury to find an aggravating circumstance if the
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428-
29 (1980) (invalidating instruction permitting the jury to find an aggravating circumstance if
the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman").
89. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983).
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a broad inquiry .... Complete jury discretion is constitutionally permissible."'
Therefore, the jury's consideration of victim-impact evidence does not need to be
guided nearly as specifically as does its consideration of evidence which supports the
existence of an aggravating factor.9' Finally, the Constitution does not require
scientifically precise guidelines for what is necessarily a somewhat subjective
calculation; rather, it requires general guidelines which cabin rather than eliminate the
jury's discretion. After all, arbitrary means ungoverned by rule, not the absence of a
rule that allows no discretion.9'
A related but separate objection is that capital punishment statutes do not
specifically mention victim-impact evidence, and hence admitting victim-impact
evidence raises due process concerns: murderers cannot know that they will be held
responsible for the "indirect" harm they inflict, because this harm is not specifically
proscribed by statute.93 As Professor Susan Bandes notes, "[it is an essential tenet of
90. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275-76. Buchanan's discussion of the Court's requiring "a
broad inquiry" occurs in the context of deciding whether the Eighth Amendment requires that
capital juries "be instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence generally, or on particular
statutory mitigating factors." Id. at 270. However, the Court has not said that the jury's broad
inquiry must be limited to mitigating evidence and has not stated a reason why this
constitutional evidentiary standard for the selection phase would not apply to victim-impact
evidence (and all other relevant evidence) as well as mitigating evidence. Cf Tuilaepa, 512
U.S. at 971-73, 978-79 (noting that at the selection phase, the State can allow the jury
unfettered discretion); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875, 878-79 (1983) (rejecting the
argument that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), prohibits states from allowing a
capital sentencing jury "to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death
penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is [death-eligible]" and noting
that accepting this argument would require overruling Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
since the capital sentencing statute in that case "clearly did not channel the jury's discretion
by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances").
91. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275.
92. I thank Professor Marvin Cummins for this point. Cf Harrisv. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
512 (1995) ("[T]he Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any specific weight to
particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by the sentencer.");
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (rejecting the notion that "a specific method
for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is
constitutionally required"); Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 ("[T]here can be 'no perfect procedure for
deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death."') (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
93. Of course, this objection does not apply to capital sentencing schemes that specifically
authorize the admission of victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings. In Payne,
the victim-impact evidence was not admitted pursuant to a statute authorizing the admission
of such evidence. Payne, 501 U.S. at 821. In fact, when Payne was decided, no state
specifically authorized the admission of victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing. See
Johnson, supra note 3, at 800. Since Payne, 12 of the 38 states which employ capital
punishment have revised their death penalty statutes to explicitly permit the introduction of
victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing. See id. at 800 n.43. Of the remaining 26 death
penalty states, 15 have statutes that include a "catch-all" phrase that authorizes the admission
at sentencing of all relevant evidence, and 11 have statutes that do not provide for the
admission of evidence not relevant to the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors. See ic
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due process that if the defendant's conduct does not meet the criteria for a previously
defined crime, he cannot be punished for that conduct."' But victim-impact evidence
does not alter the type of offense for which the defendant has been convicted and
charged; rather, it is "simply another form or method of informing the sentencing
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a
general type long considered by sentencing authorities.""5 Furthermore, in noncapital
as well as capital sentencing decisions, judges and juries often consider factors not
mentioned in the relevant statute, such as the defendant's future dangerousness or the
extent to which he is remorseful, and the Court has found this practice consistent with
due process.96
IV. EMOTION, REASON, AND DEATH
Opponents of victim-impact evidence contend that it prevents jurors from making
a "rational" (that is, devoid of emotional influence) sentencing determination97 and
injects volatile and improper emotions into the capital sentencing decision.98 But it
is unrealistic to expect a capital sentencing jury's decision to be wholly devoid of
emotion. Capital sentencing juries' decisions are never unaffected by emotion. No
capital sentencing jury could possibly decide solely on the basis of "pure" reason.99
Emotions cannot be neatly separated from reasoning; each includes aspects of the
other."° Furthermore, the decision of whether a particular individual deserves the
94. Bandes, supra note 3, at 396 n. 177 (noting that due process, fair play, "and the settled
rules of law" require that "the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties").
Bandes argues that in the absence of a specific statutory proscription, considering the harm
inflicted upon a murder victim's survivors "conflicts with the legal principle of nulla poena
sine lege (the requirement of prior notice that particular conduct is criminal).... [T]o the
extent that courts take the magnitude of harm into consideration, they must do so within the
boundaries previously authorized by legislative enactment." Id.
95. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
96. See id at 820-21 ("IT]he sentencing authority has always been free to consider a wide
range of relevant material."); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) ("[A] judge
may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come."); cf. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding thatjudge's imposition of death sentence based in part on
presentencing report prepared by probation department, despite life imprisonment
recommended by jury, did not violate Due Process Clause).
97. See Levy, supra note 3, at 1046.
98. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 392-93; Levy, supra note 3, at 1046; Talbert, supra
note 38, at 209.
99. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CoRNELL L.REv. 655 (1989) (arguing that capital sentencing decisions always
do and should have some emotional basis).
100. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 366 ("[T]here is broad agreement on one crucial
point-that emotions have a cognitive aspect-and its corollary-that reasoning has an
emotive aspect."); Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 877-78 ("IT]he glib distinction between 'reasoned'
responses and 'emotional' responses is far too simplistic.... [S]cholars from fields as diverse
as philosophy, psychology, and neurobiology have demonstrated that emotions have a
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death penalty necessarily is partly subjective, depending in part on whether the
defendant's mitigating testimony induced jurors to feel empathy towards him and on
jurors' perceptions of the "heinousness" of the crime.' Moreover, arguing that
evidence yielding an emotional reaction should be inadmissible "would prove (and
would exclude) far too much, because a high proportion of now-admissible evidence
produces some emotional reaction injurors."'12 In sum, "the issue is boundedness, not
whether emotion has a place."' 3
However, that some victim-impact evidence is highly inflammatory, and thus may
be more prejudicial than probative, is clear. Still, "'the Court has never held 'that the
excessively inflammatory character of concededly relevant evidence can form the
basis for a constitutional attack.""" Moreover, victims' statements are "'unlikely to
be more emotional.., than the widely accepted presentations by defendants and their
families and friends at sentencing hearings."" 5
Furthermore, courts can decide according to their jurisdictions' evidentiary
standards whether victim-impact evidence is admissible."° The fact that some victim-
impact evidence may be more prejudicial than probative does not justify excluding
all victim-impact evidence as inherently arbitrary under the Eighth Amendment any
more than the fact that some proffered mitigating testimony is excessively emotional
and lacks any probative value justifies excluding all mitigating evidence. However,
because "even some legitimate victim impact evidence could inflame or unduly
prejudice a jury if admitted in excess,"'07 courts should be wary of admitting
repetitive victim-impact evidence. When the evidence introduced is highly emotional,
judges should be vigilant and decisive in ending the presentation of victim-impact
evidence before the cumulative emotional weight of the testimony outstrips its
probative value and the delicate balance between probative and prejudicial evidence
cognitive dimension ... emotions can open up ways of knowing and seeing, and can therefore
contribute to reasoning."); Harris, supra note 3, at 92 ("Emotions are not inimical to the
reasoning process, particularly in a contextual decision-making situation. Rather, emotions,
being partly cognitive, are partly intellectual and can serve as guides to reasoned decision
making.").
101. See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 878; Pillsbury, supra note 99, at 655-56, 699-703.
102. Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 877.
103. Id at 879; see also Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 947 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We must
recognize that the state should not be required to present victim impact evidence ... devoid
of all passion.").
104. William L. Menard et al., Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-1990: Capital Punishment, 79 GEO. L.J.
1123, 1141 n.2394 (1991) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,878 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
105. Talbert, supra note 38, at 203 n.23 (omission in original) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROPOSED MODEL LEGISLATION, 11-9 (1986)).
106. See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 870-71 & n.18.
107. Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748,751 (Ga. 1994); see also State v. Muhammad, 678
A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996) ("The greater the number of survivors who are permitted to present
victim impact evidence, the greater the potential for the victim impact evidence to unduly
prejudice thejury against the defendant."); Johnson, supra note 3, at 816 ("[W]ith each witness
paraded before the jury, the chances increase that an appellate court will view such evidence
as cumulative and prejudicial.").
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tips in favor of the latter.' In particularly extreme cases where victim-impact
evidence might have rendered a capital sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair, the
defendant can seek relief under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
109
Related to the argument that victim-impact evidence induces visceral, emotional
reactions injurors which lead them to impose death sentences on irrational and hence
arbitrary bases is the charge- that victim-impact evidence distracts jurors from
focusing on the defendant's culpability."' This allegation presupposes that victim-
impact evidence is irrelevant to the defendant's culpability: if the evidence is
relevant, then it is hardly a distraction. Thus, the claim that the emotional nature of
victim-impact evidence diverts jurors' minds is really just another way of phrasing
the argument (which I will address later) that victim-impact evidence is irrelevant to
the defendant's culpability.
Finally, some commentators not opposed to emotional testimony in general object
to victim-impact evidence because it arouses jurors' passions for revenge. However,
"[tihe principal objection to revenge, that it lacks measure or discrimination because
the victim of the wrong is the self-appointed judge, has no force when the issue is
merely the admissibility of victim impact statements before a disinterested judge (or
jury)."' 1 Moreover, the Constitution says nothing about the penological relevance of
108. While the FederalRules ofEvidence do not apply at sentencing proceedings, Rule 403
provides an example of adequate guidelines for judges deciding whether to admit victim-
impact evidence at capital sentencing. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. "'Unfair prejudice' ... means an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily,
an emotional one." FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's note.
109. The Court has left little room for defendants to argue that improper prosecutorial
comments rendered their trial fundamentally unfair. For instance, in Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1986), the Court found no denial of due process even though the prosecutor
referred to the defendant as an "animal" and several times said that someone should have
"blown [the defendant's] head off." Id. at 180 n.12. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in
Darden, said, "[I]t 'is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even
universally condemned.' The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments 'so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."'
Id. at 181 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 1983), and
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
In the rare cases in which aprosecutor's comments may have rendered a criminal proceeding
fundamentally unfair, courts should not allow the result of the tainted proceeding to stand
simply because the trial judge instructed the jurors to disregard the inflammatory evidence.
It is illogical to believe that jurors will be so inflamed as to render an unjust
decision which violates Due Process but not so inflamed that they cannot obey
the judge's instructions to ignore the evidence or prosecutorial argument that is
the source of those emotions. The whole point is that the evidence or argument
may have subverted the jurors' ability to follow the law.
Levy, supra note 3, at 1056.
110. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 401; Dugger, supra note 3, at 403-04.
111. Richard A. Posner, LegalNarratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737,745 (1997) (reviewing
LAw's SToIUEs: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
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revenge, and the Court has certified revenge (couched as "retribution") as an
acceptable reason for imposing the death penalty." 2 Even if imposing the death
penalty to exact vengeance is bad policy, it is not unconstitutional."
V. CULPABILITY, CONSEQUENCES, AND
WHAT "ARBITRARY" MEANS
The claim that victim-impact evidence is irrelevant to a capital defendant's
culpability fails to demonstrate that such evidence yields arbitrary death sentences
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (However, as explained in Part VI, this
criticism does highlight the major problem with allowing victim-impact evidence at
capital sentencing hearings: it allows negligently caused harm to be "the defining line
between life and death."" 4) Like the first three allegations that admitting victim-
impact evidence makes the capital sentencing decision arbitrary, this criticism applies
to many forms ofmitigating evidence as well. For example, how is the grief--or lack
thereof-of a capital defendant's family members relevant to his culpability? Is it
relevant to his blameworthiness that the defendant met his girlfriend at church or that
he "was an extremely polite prisoner"?' Such mitigating evidence is routinely
admitted during capital sentencing hearings even though it is irrelevant to the
defendant's blameworthiness. In addition, neither a prediction of a murderer's future
dangerousness nor whether he has a significant criminal record is indicative of his
culpability," 6 yet the Court has held that this information can constitute an
aggravating factor.' '7
Furthermore, punishing two equally culpable defendants differently on the basis of
the harm they caused is not arbitrary. One cannot say of a post-Payne capital
punishment system that "[t]here is no principled way to distinguish [cases] in which
the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.""' "There
is a distinguishing principle: the harm the victims suffered.""' 9 To be "arbitrary"
means to be ungoverned by any rule or principle. That the governing principle may
be unsound does not render the results capricious.
1996)).
112. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); see also Posner, supra note 111, at
745 ("Revenge is primitive, in the sense of instinctual, as also is love, of which compassion
for a criminal is a dilute form; but I do not think that the primitiveness of an emotion should
disqualify it from playing a role in sentencing.").
113. However, vengeance cannot be the only reason for imposing the death penalty. See
infra note 151.
114. Sullivan, supra note 57, at 630.
115. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991).
116. However, such evidence is relevant to the larger question of whether the defendant
should live or die. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976).
117. See id. at 269, 274-76.
118. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
119. Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the
Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1303, 1316 (1988)
(emphasis in original).
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VI. RETRIBUTION, UNFORESEEN HARM,
AND DESERT
As indicated in the preceding Part, the strongest objection to allowing victim-
impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings is that it sheds no light on whether the
defendant deserves the death penalty."' Murderers often are not aware of their
victims' personal characteristics or interpersonal relationships when they kill them.
Nor can one assume that those who kill consider the possibility that their crime will
harm third parties; many murderers may never consciously consider this risk. If two
murderers have equally culpable mental states when they killed, why should the state
execute only one merely because he inflicted more unforeseen harm? Neither
murderer killed in order to harm his victim's survivors-and likely never considered
the risk of causing harm to third parties-so why should the fortuity that one
murderer's victim left behind a loving family and many friends, while the other
murderer's victim was a loner with no significant social ties, affect their respective
sentences?
In order to evaluate this criticism of Payne, it is necessary to understand a little bit
about culpability, the penological theory of retribution, and the Court's statements
about retribution with regard to capital punishment.
A. Retribution's Four Variants and
the Court's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence
A sentencing scheme based on the theory of retribution can assess punishments in
four distinct ways: purely according to the criminal's mental state ("pure culpability-
based retribution"), purely according to the harm the criminal's crime caused society
("pure harm-based retribution"), or according to one of two formulations which take
into account both the criminal's culpability and the harm he caused ("impure
culpability-based retribution" and "impure harm-based retribution"). 2 ' Pure
culpability-based retribution examines what the defendant intended to do or to risk
doing and punishes the defendant solely according to his mental state." Thus, under
120. This Part employs the Model Penal Code's five-level hierarchy of mental states. In
order of increasing culpability, the five mental states are strict liability, negligence (the
defendant should have known his conduct risked causing harm, or a "reasonable" person would
have been aware or foreseen that his conduct created a risk of harm), recklessness (the
defendant was consciously aware that his conduct created a substantial risk of harm),
knowledge (the defendant was consciously aware that his conduct was virtually certain to
cause harm), and purpose (the defendant's conscious object was to cause harm). See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
Despite its logical and philosophical merits, the Court has never incorporated into its Eighth
Amendmentjurisprudence the Model Penal Code's principle that punishment should be based
solely on culpability. Note that if the Eighth Amendment prohibited factoring the harm caused
into noncapital sentencing decisions, differentiating between the sentences for attempts and
completed crimes would be unconstitutional.
121. See Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 237, 237-38 (1994).
122. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
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a theory of culpability-based retribution, attempted and successful crimes should be
punished equally, since consequences are irrelevant to culpability." Pure harm-based
retribution, in contrast, measures the harm the defendant caused and imposes
punishment without regard to the defendant's culpability. The offender's intent and
expectations are irrelevant to pure harm-based retribution; consequences alone
determine the appropriate punishment.
In addition to its pure culpability and pure harm-based forms, retribution can in two
ways encompass both the offender's culpability and the harm he causes. 24 Under
"impure culpability-based retribution," an offender's level of culpability determines
the outer boundary of the range ofpermissible punishments, but within this range, the
harmhis crime causes affects his punishment.'" As Professor Michael S. Moore says,
"Culpability sets the outer limits of desert and thus, of proportionate punishment.
(Proximately) causing the harm intended or risked brings one's deserts up to those
limits but causing more harm than intended or risked does not increase one's deserts
beyond those limits."' 26 Impure culpability-based retribution pervades our criminal
law.'27 For example, impure culpability-based retribution explains why completed
crimes are punished more severely than attempts: a murderer and an attempted
murderer maybe equally culpable, but the different levels of harm they cause greatly
affect their criminal liability."
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 131 (1968).
123. See id. ("Why should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not
occurred be a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally
wicked?").
124. See Moore, supra note 121, at 237-38.
125. "[W]hen culpability is present, wrongdoing independently influences how much
punishment is deserved." Id. at 238.
126. Id. at 281.
127. Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said, "'moral
luck,' as philosophers refer to distinctions in culpability that are based on consequences rather
than intentions, is, rightly or wrongly, a pervasive characteristic of moral thought in our
society, at least the moral thought that informs the criminal law." United States v. Martinez,
16 F.3d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Than, 118 F.3d 1501, 1507 (11 th
Cir. 1997) ("Distinctions based on the consequences of a criminal act, as opposed to the
intentions of the actor, represent an enduring and pervasive characteristic of the moral thought
that informs our system of criminal law.").
On the relevance of moral luck to criminal responsibility, see, for example, THOMASNAGEL,
MoralLuck, in MORTALQUESTIONS 24,24-38 (Thomas Nagel ed., 1979); BERNARDWHI.AMS,
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHnCAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20, 20-39 (Bernard
Williams ed., 198 1); R.A. Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment ofAttempts, 9 LAW
& PHiL 1, 30-37 (1990); Moore, supra note 121, at 253-58. For arguments that moral luck is
irrelevant to criminal responsibility, see, for example, IMMANUELKANT, GROUNDWoRKOFTHE
METAPHYSICOFMORALSpassim (H.J. Paton trans., 1964) (1785); LarryAlexander, Crime and
Culpability, 5 J. CoNTEMw. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The
Criminal Law and the Luck ofthe Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique ofEmphasis on the Results of Conduct in the
Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1601-03 (1974).
128. See Moore, supra note 12 1, passim.
1372 [Vol. 75:1349
VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE
The other way in which retribution can take both culpability and harm into account
is "impure harm-based retribution." Under this fourth theory of retribution, only
offenders who have a threshold level of culpability receive punishment, but they are
held strictly liable for the full extent of the harm they cause even if their culpability
does not extend to the full range of the harm they cause. A criminal is punished for
all of the harm he caused if he only intended to cause or recklessly risked causing a
portion of the harm he caused. The common law doctrines of felony-murder and
"intent to inflict grievous bodily harm murder" are examples of this fourth form of
retribution. 29
The Court has come to acknowledge that "retribution" is the main penological
interest justifying capital punishment 3° -and the overriding consideration for
whether a particular type of evidence is admissible at capital sentencing, where the
focus is on whether the defendant deserves death. 3' But the Justices have never
clearly explained what they mean by "retribution." Nonetheless, since the Justices
purport to rely on retribution to guide their analyses of capital punishment issues, I
will examine Payne under the four theories of retribution and the Court's death
penalty precedents to determine whether it can fit simultaneously within one of the
four theories of retribution and the Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
B. Victim-Impact Evidence and Culpability
Payne's main flaw is that it permits negligently caused harm to be the decisive
factor in whether a capital defendant lives or dies. Under Payne, if two equally
129. See id at 280; cf Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 937,999 (1985) ("Often the substantive law defines the criminal offense and the sanction
to be imposed by the actual harm that has resulted. The definition of an offense frequently
depends on the result of the conduct-simple battery, aggravated assault, and murder all
encompass particular results within their definitions."). Similarly, the current United States
Sentencing Guidelines allow departures from the recommended sentences for consequences
of criminal conduct. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.1 (death), 5K2.2
(physical injury), 5K2.3 (extreme psychological injury), 5K2.5 (property damage or loss)
(1996).
130. The lead opinion in Gregg v. Georgia said that the Eighth Amendment permits a state
to impose the death penalty in order to advance two penological objectives: retribution and
deterrence. 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). Since Gregg, the Court has come to rely more on
retribution than deterrence. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("T]he interest that [the Court has] identified as the principal justification for the
death penalty is retribution...."). Apparently, many of the Justices have ceased believing that
the death penalty deters crimes-and a number of studies support the Justices' shift away from
relying on deterrence to justify capital punishment. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information
Center, Facts About Deterrence and the Death Penalty (visited Sept. 15, 1999) <http://www.
essential.org/dpic/deter.html> (citing statistics indicating that the death penalty fails to deter
murders).
131. When evaluating Eighth Amendment challenges to capital sentencing proceedings, the
Court has consistently noted that the death penalty should be a "'reasoned moral response."'
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,328 (1989) (quoting Califomiav. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Unlike retribution, deterrence is a utilitarian penological
theory that focuses on results rather than moral desert.
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culpable murderers commit essentially the same crime, one may be executed while
the other lives solely because the former's victims suffered more (or appeared to
suffer more) than the latter's.'32 By maintaining that the harm to a murder victim's
family members is relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness, the Payne majority
tacitly (unwittingly?) accepted the theory of impure harm-based retribution.
Victim-impact evidence informs the jury of harm with respect to which the
defendant was merely negligent. If a murderer knew his victim's family and
community would be harmed by the victim's death, or was aware that there was a
substantial risk of this, then this harm may plausibly be deemed relevant to whether
he deserves death, since he inflicted it knowingly or recklessly.' But if a murderer
never considered the fact that by killing he might harm people other than his
immediate victim, even though a "reasonable" person would have thought of this, he
is merely negligent with respect to the harm he causes his victim's family and
community. Even if one made a distinction between murderers who know their
victims and murderers who do not know their victims, one cannot assume that the
former consciously consider the possibility that they could harm their victims'
families and communities.
In one passage of his opinion, Justice Souter indicated that he believed that all
murderers are reckless with respect to the possibility that their murder will harm their
victims' survivors. "Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence
for criminal responsibility . . . that the person to be killed probably has close
associates, 'survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's
death."' 34 If, as Justice Souter suggests, every murderer knew that by killing his
victim he creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he will inflict harm upon his
victim's survivors, there would be a far stronger argument for the relevance of
victim-impact evidence to a capital defendant's culpability. But a murderer might
never consider, before (or even after) killing his victim that by doing so he might
severely harm other people's lives as well. Certainly a "reasonable" murderer would
take this into account. Perhaps many murderers do take this into account (although
it seems doubtful that death-eligible murderers are so reflective before committing
a heinous crime). Even if most murderers took this into account, however, this would
not justify an automatic presumption that any particular murderer was reckless with
respect to causing harm to third parties.
That a capital murderer is necessarily (at least) negligent with respect to the
probability that he will harm the murder victim's survivors offers terribly weak
132. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court includes the statement that victim-
impact evidence is necessary "for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral
culpability and blameworthiness." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). However,
this is the only statement in either Rehnquist's opinion or the concurrences of Justices
O'Connor and Scaliathat claims victim-impact evidence sheds light on the capital defendant's
moral guilt. Since most of Rehnquist's opinion rests on the harm-based theory of retribution,
criticism of the Court's culpability analysis should be directed primarily at Justice Souter,
whose concurrence repeatedly emphasizes the ostensible significance of negligently caused
harm for determining a capital defendant's blameworthiness. See id. at 837-39 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
134. Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
1374 [Vol. 75:1349
VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE
support for allowing this harm, when it occurs, to determine whether a defendant
lives or dies. The murderer who kills a victim with no social ties is no less negligent
than one whose victim has a family and whose death causes her community great
harm. Both "should have known" that their victim might have social ties. As with the
argument for punishing negligence in other contexts, therefore, this argument fails
to explain why two equally negligent persons should be punished differently on the
basis of the harm they caused. 3 ' While allowing moral luck to determine the
appropriate punishment arguably makes sense when the "defendant possesses the
culpable mental state of purpose or recklessness, punishing negligently caused harm
is dubious, particularly when a human life is on the line.3 6 Thus the claim that the
"foreseeability of the killing's consequences imbues them with direct moral
relevance' 3 either misunderstands the level of culpability involved or rests on the
premise that under a culpability-based theory of retribution, the Eighth Amendment
permits negligently caused harm to determine a capital defendant's fate.
The impure culpability-based theory of retribution also fails to explain the
relevance ofvictim-impact evidence. To see why, considerthe flaw in Justice Scalia's
analogy to the difference in the punishments imposed upon a murderer whose gun
worked correctly and a would-be murderer whose gun misfires." 8 A person who pulls
the trigger of a gun with-the conscious object of killing another human being thereby
sets the outer boundary of his culpability at intentional murder. However, if the gun
misfires, he is guilty only of attempted murder. Thus in Justice Scalia's example the
level of culpability (intentional murder) encompasses the results of both the
completed and attempted crimes. The victim-impact evidence question is distinct
from the murder-attempted murder dichotomy. Murderers (generally) lack the mental
state of either intent or recklessness with respect to the harm they will cause their
victim's family. Therefore-unless they consciously consider the risks of harm to
thirdparties-purposeful murderers' culpability does not include the harm they inflict
upon the victim's family. Because this harm to third parties extends beyond the harm
with respect to which they possessed the mental state of purpose or recklessness, it
ought not affect their punishment under a theory of impure culpability-based
135. See PHILLIP E. JOHNsON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERALS AND TEXT 204-05 (5th
ed. 1995).
136. But see Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 872 ("[Tlo the extent that predictable and foreseeable
consequences of murder actually occur in a specific case, that particular evidence seems to
provide a highly relevant reason for punishing a particular defendant more severely.").
Assuming that Gewirtz does not view negligence, standing alone, as a sufficiently culpable
mental state to make the difference between life and death, he evidently adheres to the impure
harm-based theory of retribution-a theory which the Court had never endorsed in the capital
punishment context until Payne. See infra text accompanying note 151-54.
137. Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
138. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If a bank
robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death.
If the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his
responsibility in the former is greater."); Murphy, supra note 119, at 1325-26 ("[E]ligibility
for the death penalty always depends upon the harm that results .... Fortuitous factors,
irrelevant to the offender's culpability, can always intervene to save the victim's and
consequently the defendant's life.") (emphases in original).
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retribution. 3 9
The analogy to reckless driving and vehicular manslaughter (or reckless homicide)
proffered by Justices White and Scalia 40 is similarly unconvincing, although for more
subtle reasons.' 4 1 The act of murder has less to do with how much harm it will inflict
on the victim's associates than the act of driving recklessly has to do with whether
someone dies and the act of driving recklessly becomes manslaughter. The more
dangerously one drives, the more likely it is that his conduct will cause a death. The
same cannot be said of murder: the extent to which a murder is particularly heinous
and cruel does not necessarily correlate with the resulting level of harm to third
parties. While a particularly heinous murder might inflict more harm upon the
victim's family and community, the harm to the victim's family members and
community results primarily from the fact that the victim is dead.
On the other hand, reckless drivers do not intendto commit any crime; most death-
eligible murderers purposely take human life. Moreover, murder's potential to harm
persons other than the immediate victim is a risk far more likely to become a reality
than the risk for a reckless driver. Furthermore, reckless drivers are often not really
"reckless." One can drive in a manner which is objectively reckless without being
consciously aware-although a reasonable person would have been-that his driving
presents a substantial risk of harm to others. Hence one may be convicted of reckless
driving-and thus of manslaughter, ifa pedestrian crosses the streetat an inopportune
moment-for being merely negligent. Thus punishing a "reckless" driver for
vehicular manslaughter may impose criminal responsibility beyond the bounds set by
the offender's culpable mental state alone. A subjectively negligent driver who hits
and kills a pedestrian while driving in an objectively reckless manner is punished for
causing harm with respect to which he was merely negligent.
Thus the real difference between the reckless driving-manslaughter dichotomy and
whether victim-impact evidence is relevant to capital sentencing is simply that the
former involves a noncapital crime while the latter entails the prospect of a death
139. Perhaps Justice Scalia meant to suggest that although the harm caused is normally not
relevant to an offender's criminal responsibility when it is outside the range of culpability
(with recklessness being the minimal relevant level of culpability), when one commits capital
murder and the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of at least
one aggravated factor, at that point the harm caused by the crime may be considered in
deciding whether the defendant lives or dies. Cf Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 871 ("[E]ven
assuming that blameworthiness is the only measure ofrelevance in deciding whetherto impose
the death penalty, why isn't the defendant to blame for the suffering endured by the survivors
of someone he or she has intentionally murdered?"). If so, this would fall under impure harm-
based retribution, which the Court had never sanctioned prior to Payne. See infra text
accompanying notes 151-54.
140. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf
Talbert, supra note 38, at 208-09 (arguing that while the harm caused may justify
distinguishing between two different offenses, as in White and Scalia's examples, two
defendants convicted of the same offense should not receive different sentences because their
respective victims' families suffered different levels of harm). If the state may legitimately
distinguish offenses on the basis of the harm caused, however, why may it not distinguish
among perpetrators of the same crime on the basis of the harm they inflict?
141. Professor George Fisher was instrumental in helping me sort through the problems with
White and Scalia's reckless driving-manslaughter analogy to victim-impact evidence.
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sentence. The Court has said on numerous occasions that "death is different.' 42
Principles that apply to noncapital crimes are often inapposite in the capital context.
Imposing a lengthy prison sentence for negligently driving into a pedestrian is
therefore not really analogous to allowing victim-impact evidence to transform what
would otherwise be a life sentence into the ultimate punishment.
Nor do the Court's felony-murder precedents support the proposition that the
Eighth Amendment permits a State to make a defendant's negligence the difference
between life or death. Prior to Booth and Gathers, the Court held in Enmund v.
Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from executing a person for
being the "getaway car" driver for an armed robbery during which his co-felons
killed.'43 The Court emphasized that Enmund did not intend or anticipate that life
would be lost during the robbery.' 4 Enmund thus suggests that a defendant's
negligence with respect to the possibility that someone might die cannot sustain a
death sentence. Tison v. Arizonat45 similarly indicates that the Eighth Amendment
imposes a culpability requirement for the capital sentencing decision. Tison held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prevent a State from executing a defendant who
initiated a prison escape and, although not a participant in the killing, watched as one
of the escapees committed murder following the escape.'46 Although neither Tison
brother "took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain would, cause
death," their "reckless indifference to human life" rendered them responsible for the
harm which resulted from the escape.
47
Admittedly, Tison is somewhat ambiguous because portions of Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion oscillated between relying on negligence and extreme recklessness.
For example, Justice O'Connor wrote:
[We hold that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represqnts a
highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in
making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural,
though also not inevitable, lethal result. 4
Earlier in her opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that one of the Tison brothers "could
have foreseen that lethal force might be used.""' These statements suggest that the
proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have recognized the grave risk
of death because the words "known" and "could have foreseen" do not require that
the defendants themselves were aware of this risk. However, Justice O'Connor later
142. See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12; Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516 (1995);
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4
(1990); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,289,294 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797
(1982), Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion).
143. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782, 788, 797-801.
144. See id at 801.
145. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
146. See id. at 139-41, 157-58.
147. Id. at 150-51, 158.
148. Id at 157-58 (emphasis added).
149. Id at 152 (emphasis added).
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stated, "we simply hold that major participation in the felony committed, combined
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund
culpability requirement."' In view of the Court's holding in Enmund and Justice
O'Connor's repeated use of the word "reckless," Tison should be viewed as standing
for the proposition that reckless indifference to human life is the minimal level of
culpability (with respect to the possibility that death will result from one's conduct)
for which one may be executed consistently with the Eighth Amendment.
However, one might argue that Enmund and Tison involved the level of culpability
with respect to the possibility that someone could die, not with respect to the
"indirect" effects of a defendant's actions on the immediate victim's survivors. If
Tison could be executed for a killing he didn't even intend to commit, why can't
Payne be executed in part based on victim-impact evidence for a murder which he
purposefully carried out? The answer is straightforward: under a pure culpability-
based or impure culpability-based theory of retribution, negligently caused harm is
not relevant to the capital sentencing decision. However, under the impure harm-
based form of retribution, harm with respect to which the offender is not culpable is
relevant.' Thus we must examine whether the Court's rulings permit death to be
imposed under an impure harm-based theory of retribution.
The Court's pre-Payne death penalty rulings preclude the conclusion that impure
harm-based retribution can justify a death sentence. The Court has consistently held
that a defendant cannot be executed unless he killed intentionally or with reckless
indifference to human life. Gregg held that vengeance helps justify capital
punishment, but noted that the Court was "concerned here only with the imposition
of capital punishment for the crime of murder ... when a life has been taken
deliberately by the offender."' 52 Enmund said that whether retribution can justify the
death penalty "depends on the degree of [the defendant]'s culpability," and
specifically on whether the defendant intendedto kill."3 And in Tison, while the harm
the defendants caused was crucial to their eligibility for the death penalty, their
"culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life" was necessary as
well.' Until Payne, what the Court probably meant but was either unable or
unwilling to say is that death may be imposed only under a theory of pure culpability-
based or impure culpability-based retribution.
Payne is the first decision by the Court that permits the life-or-death decision to
turn on harm with respect to which the defendant was not at least extremely reckless.
Even putting the weight of precedent aside, the Court was right before Payne not to
allow a death sentence to be predicated upon impure harm-based retribution. "Death
is different,"'5 5 and allowing negligently caused harm to determine whether a
150. Id. at 158.
151. The pure harm-based theory of retribution cannot support the outcome in Payne. No
Justice has said that blind vengeance alone can support a death sentence-some culpable
mental state is a prerequisite for a constitutionally acceptable execution. Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would permit a State to execute one who is merely negligent-or even strictly
liable-with respect to a death occurring. Clearly, Enmund precludes this outcome.
152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (emphasis added).
153. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982).
154. Tison, 481 U.S. at 151, 158.
155. See supra note 142.
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defendant lives or dies-the biggest sentencing differential imaginable-is unfair.
VII. THE "BALANCING" JUSTIFICATION FOR
VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE
As described in Part I, in addition to its misguided retribution arguments, the Payne
majority relied heavily on the argument that victim-impact evidence is relevant to the
capital sentencing decision because it "balances" the impact of the mitigating
evidence presented by capital defendants and thereby helps to correct an imbalance
in the way the criminal law treats victims and defendants. This argument presupposes
that the criminal justice system neglects crime victims while privileging defendants,
and that fairness demands that capital sentencing decisions take victims' interests into
account. 5 6 Introducing victim-impact evidence at sentencing, it is said, ensures
adequate respect for victims and blunts the impact of defendants' mitigating
evidence.'57 As the Supreme Court of Tennessee put it:
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that at
sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the background,
character and good deeds of Defendant... without limitation as to relevancy, but
nothing may be said that bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon
the victims.'58
Although this is a powerful political argument which possesses great emotional
appeal, it is improper in the context of capital sentencing. Like the overtly political
arguments for victim-impact evidence offered by many victims' rights advocates,'59
156. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 77 (1982) ("The
victim, no less than the defendant, comes to court seeking justice."). Of course, this part of the
balancing argument assumes that murder victims' survivors want the defendant to die for his
crime. This assumption, however, is not always valid; a victim's survivors may be
philosophically opposed to capital punishment.
157. Or as Chief Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit puts it,
when it comes to emotion-evoking testimony at capital sentencing, "what is sauce for the goose
should be sauce for the gander." Posner, supra note 111, at 745; see also Livingston v. State,
444 S.E.2d 748, 755 (Ga. 1994) (Carley, J., concurring specially) ("[T]he very purpose of
victim impact evidence is to counteract that very broad range of mitigating evidence which the
defendant is authorized to introduce....").
158. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (1990), quoted in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
826 (199 1); see also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRME, supra note 156, at 77
("When the court hears, as it may, from the defendant, his lawyer, his family and friends, his
minister, and others, simple fairness dictates that the person who has borne the brunt of the
defendant's crime be allowed to speak.").
159. Many victims' rights advocates argue that increasing the extent to which victims are
involved in the prosecution of the person who harmed them assists victims' efforts to cope with
the psychological impact of the crime by helping victims regain a sense of control and allowing
them to "vent" their anger at the defendant. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS
OF CRIME, supra note 156, at 76. However, the purpose of a capital sentencing hearing is to
determine whether a convicted defendant should receive the death penalty, not to ease
surviving victims' psychological pain. That including a victim-impact statement may help
victims recover from the loss of a loved one is irrelevantto whether the defendant deserves the
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the "balancing" argument considers factors properly extrinsic to the capital
sentencing decision asjustifications for admitting it. While the former argument holds
that participating in the sentencing process helps victims' psyches, the latter
maintains that including victim-impact evidence at sentencing helps remedy our
criminaljustice system's neglect for victims. Furthermore, it is not even clear whether
admitting victim-impact evidence really helps victims.'" But this is beside the point:
trying to correct a perceived imbalance between the rights of victims and defendants
is a goal irrelevant to a capital sentencing hearing, as it bears no relevance to whether
the defendant deserves death.16 1
An Eighth Amendment analysis should focus on whether the defendant's rights are
violated, not on what assists persons suffering from the defendant's crime. Rather
than being subordinate to politicians' crime-fighting and reelection efforts, "the Bill
of Rights is designed to level the playing field between the defendant and the state;
its provisions afford extra protections to the former to counteract the awesome power
of the latter." 62 Balancing a government interest against a defendant's constitutional
rights is precarious in any situation; balancing an interest extrinsic to the capital
sentencing process against a capital defendant's constitutional rights is simply
inappropriate. 6
death penalty.
160. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 406 ("[T]he victim impact statement benefits the
conservative crime control agenda more consistently than it benefits the victim."); Henderson,
supra note 129, at 1001-03 (arguing that proponents of victim-impact evidence are more
interested in fighting crime than in genuinely helping victims).
161. The Supreme Court of Georgia said:
As it is the defendant who is on trial in a capital murder case and who is,
therefore, subject to the imposition of the death penalty, we cannot agree that
Georgia courts are required to maintain some sort of "balance" between the
victim and the defendant in a death penalty prosecution .... [L]ong-standing
Georgia law ... has never embraced a "tit-for-tat" doctrine with respect to
defendants' and victims' rights.
Livingston, 444 S.E.2d at 750 n.3.
162. Bandes, supra note 3, at 402 (emphasis in original); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 860
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The premise that a criminal prosecution requires an even-handed
balance between the State and the defendant is... incorrect. The Constitution grants certain
rights to the criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the State designed to protect
the individual from overreaching by the disproportionately powerful State.").
163. Another, less common argument is that including victim-impact evidence (or otherwise
increasing the participation of victims in the criminal justice system) encourages victims to
cooperate with prosecutors and thus helps the criminal justice system to run more efficiently.
See Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 505-06
(1986). This fourth argument suffers from the same major defect as the "to help the victims"
and "balancing" justifications: it cites a goal wholly unrelated to the purpose of a capital
sentencing hearing as a reason for admitting victim-impact evidence. Moreover, its
presupposition that admitting victim-impact evidence will increase the criminal justice
system's efficiency is as speculative asthe"to help the victims" argument's presupposition that
including victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings will assist a murder victim's
family members' efforts to cope with and recover from the crime. Controversial,
unsubstantiated hypotheses such as these do not rise to the level of a persuasive consideration
1380 [Vol. 75:1349
VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE
VIII. CONCLUSION: PA YNE, FEDERALISM,
AND PUBLIC OPINION
Since neither a culpability analysis nor a desire to advance crime victims'
ostensible interests can support the Court's conclusion in Payne, the decision is left
to stand on two rather tenuous underpinnings: public opinion and federalism.6" These
crutches for 'Payne's theoretical infirmities fail to remedy its ills. Payne thus
continues the Court's gradual reversion, largely in the name of respecting the States'
sovereignty and deferring to the people's will, towards the pre-Furman "laissez-faire"
imposition of capital punishment.
65
The federal government and all fifty states allow victim-impact evidence at
sentencing."6 The federal government and at least thirty-two of the thirty-eight death
penalty states permit victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing. 67 When a majority
of the population (as well as the Court) thinks that retribution is the primary basis for
executing murderers 6 and there is an overwhelming consensus that the harm a
murderer causes to his victim's associates is relevant to his desert, an Eighth
Amendment analysis must take this into account. 169 In addition, the Constitution
grants the States considerable latitude to decide what factors affect criminal
in the volatile context of capital sentencing hearings.
164. I will examine these two defenses for Payne together because the relevant
considerations are largely identical.
165. Cf Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 305
(arguing-presciently, since William H. Rehnquist had not yet been promoted to Chief
Justice--that in a quartet of death cases decided in 1983 the Court essentially announced that
the States could implement capital punishment as they please).
166. See National Center for Victims of Crime, Infolink: Victim Impact Statements (visited
Sept. 15, 1999) <http:/www.ncvc.org/Infolink/Info72.htm>.
167. See Logan, supra note 7, at 150.
168. Some polls find that a majority of death penalty supporters say that retribution is the
main reason for their position. A 1985 Gallup poll-the last detailed poll on the reasons for
support of capital punishment-found that aplurality (48%) of death penalty proponents based
their view on retribution (30% on "revenge" and 18% on "desert"). GALLUP ORG., GALLUP
REPORT: THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (1985). Fifty-one percent of respondents said they would
continue to favor capital punishment even if it was conclusively proven that it failed to deter
criminals. See id. "[A] factor variously called retribution, revenge, or a desire to see criminals
receive theirjust deserts seems to have become the dominant motive for supporters ofthe death
penalty." James 0. Finckenauer, Public Support for the Death Penalty: Retribution as Just
Deserts or Retribution as Revenge?, 5 JUsT. Q. 81, 90 (1988). Although a more recent poll
found that 60% of respondents did not think that "a loved one's feeling of vengeance" is a
legitimate reason for capital punishment, the result likely would have been quite different had
the pollsters asked about society's interest in vengeance or retribution rather than the victim's
"loved one"; the same poll found that 52% of respondents think the death penalty does not
deter people from committing crimes. See Eric Pooley, Death orLife?, TIME, June 16, 1997,
at 33.
169. The meaning of the Eighth Amendment is informed partly by public opinion. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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responsibility. 7 ° The Court has often noted that "the discretion to define criminal
offenses and prescribe punishments... resides wholly with the state legislatures."''
But while it goes without saying that "preventing and dealing with crime is much
more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government,"'" the quasi-
autonomous States and the citizens who reside therein remain bound by the
Fourteenth, and thus by the Eighth, Amendment."' Therefore, even though
"legislatures have always been allowed wide freedom to determine the extent to
which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime,"'" the
Eighth Amendment limits this freedom. Thus the Court has recognized that "the
Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable
to contemporary society.' 7.
Because "death is different," federalism and public opinion alone cannot support
admitting evidence of negligently caused harm which could lead a jury to sentence
to death a person who would otherwise receive a life sentence. 76 Until Payne, the
Court had never held that negligently caused harm could, consistently with the Eighth
Amendment, make the difference between life and death. Even in our era of up-to-
the-minute polls and devolution of power from the federal government to the States,
the Bill of Rights remains to check the majority's excesses. Clearly the Court will not
revisit the relevance of victim-impact evidence to capital sentencing hearings for the
foreseeable future. Thus Payne stands as yet another monument to the Court's
confused conception of culpability' and its evident desire to take any means
necessary to exit the business of monitoring the States' implementation of capital
punishment.
170. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987) (noting the Court's "reluctance... to
disturb a State's decision with respect to the definition of criminal conduct").
171. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,269 n. 18 (1984); see also Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195 (1959) ("[T]he States under our federal system have the principal responsibility
for defining and prosecuting crimes.").
172. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977), quoted in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 43 (1996).
173. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
174. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
175. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. Although the public's view that victim-impact evidence is
relevant to sentencing is not an opinion about apunishment, that it is an opinion about whether
a particular type of evidence is relevant to a punishment does not exempt it from the Eighth
Amendment principle that public opinion alone is not dispositive.
176. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 ("Although the judgments of legislatures
... weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty .... ).
177. Cf Miguel Angel Mdndez, A Sisyphean Task- The Common Law Approach to Mens
Rea, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 407 (1995) (discussing the flaws in California and U.S. Supreme
Court rulings involving issues of culpability).
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